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Abstract
In the aftermath of World War II, the world￿ s economies exhibited very di⁄erent rates of
economic recovery. We provide evidence that those countries that caught up the most
with the U.S. in the postwar period are those that also saw an acceleration in the speed
of adoption of new technologies. This acceleration is correlated with the incidence of
U.S. economic aid and technical assistance in the same period. We interpret this as
supportive of the interpretation that technology transfers from the U.S. to Western
European countries and Japan were an important factor in driving growth in these
recipient countries during the postwar decades.
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1Wars, and especially the Second World War (WWII), are extremely disruptive episodes that
lead to a major destruction of productive resources. Glick and Taylor (2010) estimate that
the total number of deaths in WWII is approximately 2 percent of the 1940 world population,
while the wounded made up another 3 percent. Wol⁄ (1991) reports that the war led to a
destruction or dismantling of about a quarter of the capital stock in Germany and Japan.
The arguably largely exogenous nature1 of these disruptions has made wars, and particularly
the recoveries that follow them, episodes that are often studied to understand the transitional
dynamics that drive economic growth.
What is especially puzzling about postwar recoveries is that countries have recovered
at very di⁄erent speeds after wars. For example, it took Spain 15 years to reach the pre-
Civil-War level of per capita GDP. Conversely, Italy reached its pre-WWII GDP level just
6 years after the end of the war. One might be tempted to think that these di⁄erent speeds
of recovery are simply due to the di⁄erent extent of war damage across countries. However,
this turns out to be an oversimpli￿ed view of the dynamics that have driven postwar growth.
A common thread that emerged from the many studies of the postwar performance of
Germany, Japan, and their industrialized counterparts,2 is that the standard Neoclassical
growth model implies a much higher postwar convergence rate than observed during postwar
growth recovery of these countries, especially that of Japan.
Furthermore, after growing at a substantially higher rate than their steady state growth
rates for several decades after WWII many countries did not converge to their prewar growth
trajectory. Instead, they converged to a growth path substantially higher than the one they
were on before the war.
In our view, these failures of the Neoclassical growth model to account for the postwar
economic growth experiences suggest the importance of the path of technological progress.
1Some evidence, for example Hess and Orphanides (1995) and Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004),
suggests that the timing of wars might not be completely exogenous.
2Van Ark and Pilat (1993) provide a detailed analysis of the performance of the manufacturing sectors.
Cette, Kocoglu, and Mairesse (2009) study labor productivity and TFP measures for Japan, France, the
U.K., and U.S.. Hayashi (1986, 1989), Christiano (1989), and Chen, Imroho… glu, and Imroho… glu (2006), focus
on Japan in particular.
2Eaton and Kortum (1997) emphasize the importance of endogenous technology adoption
for matching the postwar productivity growth experiences of the manufacturing sectors in
the world￿ s ￿ve leading industrialized economies. Gilchrist and Williams (2004) argue that
endogenous productivity growth due to the putty-clay nature of capital does a better job of
matching the postwar growth experience of these economies than the standard putty-putty
neoclassical growth model. Chen, Imroho… glu, and Imroho… glu (2006), claim that in the case
of Japan neoclassical transitional dynamics do just ￿ne when one feeds the observed path of
total factor productivity (TFP) growth into the standard growth model. However, they do
not aim to explain how this TFP-path came about.
Hence, just like cross-country di⁄erences in TFP levels account for the bulk of the enor-
mous disparities in GDP per capita levels,3 cross-country di⁄erences in TFP dynamics drive
a large part of the di⁄erences in postwar growth experiences. It is thus not only important,
as Prescott (1997) advocates, to have a theory of di⁄erences in TFP levels but it is also
important to understand the sources of di⁄erences in the dynamics of TFP.
In this paper we study the extent to which these di⁄erences in TFP dynamics across
countries can be accounted for by observed di⁄erences in technology adoption patterns. In
particular, we explore the idea that wars, in addition to destroying capital, impact the costs
of adopting new technologies. This may occur for a variety of reasons. Our main focus
here is on the reduction in adoption costs due to the postwar economic aid and technical
assistance provided by the United States to Japan and Western Europe.
We argue that this reduction of adoption costs mainly re￿ ects technology transfers from
the U.S. to other countries and that such transfers disproportionately involved knowledge
about state-of-the-art, modern, technologies. If this would be an important factor driving
postwar productivity growth, then we would observe a disproportionate acceleration in the
speed of adoption of new technologies in the countries that received economic aid and tech-
nical assistance from the U.S. during the postwar period. We then document that this is
3See Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999).
3what we observe in the data.
We do so in three steps. First, we introduce a model of technology adoption and eco-
nomic growth, similar to Comin and Hobijn (2010), that allows us to estimate the speed of
adoption of technologies, and changes in this speed, for many countries and technologies. We
use data on direct measures of technology adoption from the CHAT dataset, described in
Comin and Hobijn (2009b). These data cover major technologies related to transportation,
communication, as well as electricity, and have not been extensively used in the cross-country
analysis of postwar growth dynamics. We complement these data with data on population,
real GDP, and consumption from Maddison (2007) and Barro and Ursœa (2008). This al-
lows us to consider a sample of 10 technologies and 39 countries with a varying degree of
involvement in WWII.
We then show that U.S. economic aid and technology assistance are strongly associated
with the adoption of new technologies during the postwar period. In particular, the average
country that bene￿tted from the program reduced the lags with which it adopted the new
technologies in our sample by 4 years compared to other countries. For old technologies,
instead, we ￿nd that the assistance programs led to an increase in the adoption lags after
WWII. The di⁄erential e⁄ect of the technology assistance programs on new vs. old technolo-
gies persists after including country ￿xed e⁄ects. This ￿nding reinforces our prior that the
mechanism by which technology assistance reduces adoption lags is through a reduction in
the costs of adopting technologies rather than through an overall improvement in e¢ ciency,
since the increases in e¢ ciency associated with the latter would have a more symmetric
e⁄ect across technologies. Furthermore, the e⁄ect of technology assistance on adoption lags
is robust to controlling for institutional measures such as polity (or its postwar change) as
well as policies such as openness to trade.
The di⁄erential e⁄ect of U.S. assistance on the pace of adoption of new and old tech-
nologies as well as the robustness of the results to country ￿xed e⁄ects suggests that there
were substantial forces beyond economy-wide e⁄ects, emphasized by for example Delong and
4Eichengreen (1991) and Eichengreen (2007), that drove the acceleration in technology adop-
tion in the countries. In addition, we use the classi￿cation method of technologies applied
in Comin and Hobijn (2009a) to show that this di⁄erential e⁄ect across technologies is not
such that technologies subject to more lobbying saw a bigger decline in their adoption lags.
Thus, we conclude that we ￿nd little evidence in support of Olson￿ s (1982) hypothesis that
WWII led to the decline distributional coalitions that had slowed down technology adoption
in Japan and Western Europe before the onset of the war.
Finally, we ￿nd that the reduction in the lags with which countries adopted new technolo-
gies explains a signi￿cant part of postwar growth di⁄erentials between countries, even when
one controls for di⁄erences in institutions and openness to trade. Though this correlation is
by no means a proof of causation, we do interpret it as indicative of the importance of U.S.
technology transfers for postwar growth di⁄erentials across countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 we document the main facts about
the damage incurred by countries during WWII and the di⁄erences in their subsequent
growth experiences. We augment the evidence on real GDP per capita with evidence on the
impact of the war on technology usage and the subsequent recovery in the technology-speci￿c
measures for di⁄erent countries. We also discuss the U.S. economic and technical assistance
to Japan and Western Europe. In Section 2 we introduce the model, solve for the optimal
decisions of ￿rms and households, and de￿ne equilibrium. In the next section we explain
how the model maps into predictions for the path of observable measures of technology
adoption and use this mapping to derive reduced form equations that allow us to estimate
adoption lags. We discuss the resulting estimates of the changes in the adoption lags and
their implications in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.4
4The details of the derivations of the equations in the main text are available in an online Appendix that
is part of the NBER Working Paper version of this article.
51 WWII damage and subsequent growth
A wide range of studies have documented the very strong growth experienced by many
industrialized countries during the three decades that followed WWII.5 In this section we
give a brief review of economic growth in industrialized countries during these decades. Since
our emphasis is on technology adoption, we augment the GDP-based analysis, which is very
similar to that in other studies, with facts about the use of technologies. We ￿rst discuss
the damage done during the war and then proceed by documenting postwar growth.
Figure 1 depicts the decline in real GDP per capita and technology usage per capita
for three technologies. Since we focus on per capita measures we implicitly correct for war
deaths. Glick and Taylor (2010) tabulate estimated casualties for many countries. Their
estimates suggest that the total number of deaths in WWII is approximately 2 percent of
the 1940 world population, while the wounded made up another 3 percent.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows pre- and postwar levels of log real GDP per capita for the
countries in our sample. The horizontal axis is the 1938 log real GDP per capita level, in
deviation from that in 1946 in the U.S., while the vertical axis show the minimum of the
1945 and 1946 levels of log real GDP per capita.6 The dashed line is the 45-degree line.
Points below the 45-degree line depict countries that saw a GDP decline during the war.
The vertical distance between the point and the 45-degree line approximately equals the
percentage decline in real GDP per capita during the war. Germany, Japan, Austria, The
Netherlands, Greece, as well as Indonesia, the Phillipines, and Taiwan all saw real GDP per
capita declines in excess of 40 percent during WWII. To put this in a historical perspective,
the decline in U.S. real GDP per capita during the Great Depression was approximately 30
percent. The U.S. and Canada geared up their industrial complexes to produce military
supplies during the war period and actually saw substantial increases in real GDP per capita
5Among the many studies that touch upon this topic are Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986), De Long
(1988), Wol⁄ (1991), Van Ark and Pilat (1993).
6We take the minimum of 1945 and 1946 because WWII ended at di⁄erent times during 1945 in di⁄erent
countries. Hence, the 1945 data thus partially re￿ ect economic activity during the war rather than right
after it ended.
6during WWII.
These declines in real GDP in war-ravaged countries coincided with substantial declines
in the usage of many technologies. In terms of aggregate capital stock measures, Wol⁄(1991)
reports that WWII led to a destruction or dismantling of about a quarter of the capital stock
in Germany and Japan. Panels (b) through (d) of Figure 1 are the equivalent of panel (a)
but then for three technology usage measures rather than for real GDP. The particular three
technologies depicted are cars, electricity, and steam- and motorships, respectively.
The qualitative patterns in terms of declines in technology usage are very similar to those
in real GDP. Countries that saw active combat on their soil during the war also saw very
substantial declines in their technology usage. In fact, the merchant ￿ eets of many countries
were almost completely destroyed. Similarly, declines in cars per capita were much higher
than those in real GDP per capita. Declines in electricity production, however, were less
pronounced than those in overall economic activity.
The substantial declines in GDP and technology usage in war-ravaged countries was
followed by a remarkable post-WWII rebound. This can be seen from Figure 2. It shows
the path of log real GDP and technology usage per capita for three technologies for four
countries in our sample. The countries that we have chosen for illustrative purposes are the
United States, Germany, Japan, and Argentina. We follow De Long (1988) and De Long and
Eichengreen (1991) here and include Argentina as an example of a country that, in spite of
being relatively rich at the onset of the war and almost unscathed by WWII, did not see the
type of catch-up with the United States in the postwar period that many other industrialized
economies saw.
In terms of the paths of real GDP per capita (panel (a)), four things stand out from this
￿gure. First, after all the turbulence of the Great Depression and WWII the U.S. ended up
on approximately the same growth path it was on before 1929. Secondly, Argentina starts
to steadily fall behind the U.S. after WWII. Argentinian per capita GDP was 84 percent of
that of the U.S. in 1938 and declined to 24 percent in the 1970￿ s. The ￿nal two things to
7take away from panel (a) are the most important for the rest of the analysis in this paper.
The ￿rst is that it took Germany and Japan until between 1955 and 1960 to return back
to their prewar growth paths. The second is that, contrary to the U.S., both Germany and
Japan did not converge to this prewar path but instead busted through it and converged to
a growth path that was substantially higher than that in the prewar period.
Just like for the declines during WWII, the postwar experiences in terms of technology
usage exhibit very similar qualitative patterns as those of real GDP per capita. The U.S.
saw a relatively smooth path of technology usage for all of these technologies. Contrary to
the path of log real GDP, however, these technology usage paths are inherently non-linear.
Argentina, while comparable in terms of technology usage at the beginning of the century,
ends up trailing the other three countries by the end of it.
After the substantial declines in technology usage due to WWII we documented in Figure
1, Germany and Japan returned back to their prewar technology usage paths about as fast
or even slightly faster than they returned to their aggregate growth path. Moreover, just
like for real GDP per capita, they did not converge back to this path but instead moved
up to higher levels of technology usage. Of course, because of the non-linear nature of the
technology usage path a more formal quantitative analysis of this claim requires taking a
stance on the shape of this path, which is the reason that we introduce a theoretical model
in Section 2.
Germany and Japan are by no means the only two countries that, after the war, converged
to a higher growth path than they were on before. Many Western European countries
experienced this period of ￿supergrowth.￿As Dumke (1990) points out, the initial hypothesis
was that most of the postwar experiences of these countries could be interpreted as driven
by standard capital (re-) accumulation after the destruction during the war. This is often
referred to as the ￿Reconstruction Hypothesis￿and is inspired by the standard neoclassical
growth model with exogenous technological progress.
As better historical cross-country real GDP data became available in the 1980￿ s, empirical
8studies (Abramovitz, 1986, Baumol, 1986) emphasized that the Reconstruction Hypothesis
might be able to explain the return of these countries to their postwar growth paths but it
fails to explain the upward shifts in these paths. In order to understand these shifts, one has
to understand the determinants of the productivity growth di⁄erentials that caused them.
The observation that it is productivity growth di⁄erentials and not capital accumulation
that accounts for most of the variation in postwar growth experiences across industrialized
countries is known as the ￿Productivity Hypothesis.￿
We show, in the remainder of this paper, that the productivity growth that is at the
heart of this hypothesis coincided with an acceleration in the rate at which the countries
that caught up the most with the U.S. in the postwar decades adopted new technologies.
The question is: What is the main driver of this joint acceleration in productivity growth
and technology adoption? Was there a common factor that drove both of them, or did one
lead to the other or vice versa?
Technology adoption decisions and other productivity enhancements are endogenous to
many factors. For the purpose of our argument we distinguish two types of such factors.
The ￿rst are those that lead to direct increases in the overall e¢ ciency of the economy
which might then be ampli￿ed by an acceleration in the adoption of technologies. These
include improvements in the capacity and quality of institutions,7 The second type of factors
have small direct e⁄ects on productivity growth. Instead they a⁄ect productivity indirectly
through the reduction of adoption costs and the associated increase in the rate of technology
adoption. These factors include adoption history,8 and the international transfer of know-
how about new technologies.
In principle, observed exogenous variation in these latter factors could be used for an
instrumental variables analysis to quantify the causal e⁄ect of technology adoption on pro-
ductivity and economic growth. Unfortunately, such a source of exogenous variation is not
available and, thus, such an instrumental variables approach not feasible.
7As in, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).
8See Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010).
9Our approach here, instead, is to identify a factor that had large e⁄ects on adoption costs
through technology transfers but the variation in which across countries was probably not
exogenous. As an alternative to an instrumental variables approach, we then exploit the
di⁄erent cross-technology implications of a reduction in adoption costs as opposed to those
of other types of factors. The particular factor we focus on is postwar U.S. economic aid and
technical assistance to Western Europe and Japan.
1.1 Technical assistance and the Marshall Plan
Following World War II, how did the U.S. go about providing technical assistance to Western
Europe and Japan?
The Marshall Plan, otherwise known as the European Recovery Program, was unveiled to
the world in the summer of 1947 by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall. As Eichengreen
and Uzan (1992) describe, initially the aim of the program was to provide direct economic
relief to Western Europe in the form of capital transfers as well as ￿nancing for investment
and import purposes. While this initial e⁄ort was e⁄ective at alleviating the oppressive
economic conditions in both the European commodities and capital markets, Boel (2003)
argues that it failed to address the mounting productivity gap that had formed between the
U.S. and Europe during WWII.
According to Boel (2003), Western Europe was experiencing ￿worsening trade and pay-
ment de￿cit[s]￿which stemmed from the considerable productivity gap and its inability to
compete economically. Due to these conditions, the U.S. expanded and focused the Marshall
Plan by instituting the Technical Assistance and Productivity Programme in 1949 (Bjarnar
and Kipping, 1998). The main thrust of the Technical Assistance Program (TAP) was to
increase productivity in Western Europe. The conventional wisdom surrounding the pro-
ductivity gap was that Europe had technologically fallen behind the U.S. To address these
concerns, the U.S. used the TAP as a conduit through which to disseminate state-of-the-art
technologies, technical knowledge, and managerial sciences.
10The channels through which the technological transfer occurred inherently revolved around
the lending of U.S. specialists to Europe and the allowance of their European counterparts
to visit and observe processes in the U.S. Additionally, U.S. government agencies played an
important role in transferring technological advances. The BLS, for example, contributed
by providing statistical technical assistance which involved the exchange of specialists but
also was focused on introducing a data and statistics-rich approach to productive e¢ ciency
in Western Europe (Wasser & Dolfman, 2005).
Europe was not the sole bene￿ciary of these productivity and technology exchanges.
Tiratsoo (2000) documents how the U.S. in 1955 initiated its technical assistance program to
Japan. Like the TAP in Western Europe, the Japanese assistance plan focused on increasing
technological and productive know-how.
Anecdotal evidence provided in several studies reveals the very signi￿cant impact these
technical assistance programs had on the productivity of individual companies and industries
as a whole.
For example, Tiratsoo (2000) recounts that after the Mitsubishi Company received techni-
cal assistance from the US in building a new assembly plant it was able to increase productive
capacity by roughly 40%. The International Directory of Company Histories (Saint James
Press, 2001) describes how, in 1950, two leading executives of Toyota Motor Company,
￿... seeking new ideas for Toyota￿ s anticipated growth, ... toured Ford Motor
Company￿ s factories and observed the latest automobile production technology.
One especially useful idea they brought home from their visit to Ford resulted
in Toyota￿ s suggestion system, in which every employee was encouraged to make
suggestions for improvements of any kind.￿
Similar stories emerged about the U.S. technical assistance in Europe. Wasser and Dolf-
man (2005) cite one source as saying productivity within individual industries ￿commonly
increased by 25 to 50 percent within a year with little or no investment￿due to the TAP.
11Thus the TAP was not about stimulating productivity gains through capital spending as
much as it was focused on the dissemination of technological and productive know-how
about state-of-the-art technologies.
The extent of the knowledge transfers from the U.S. to Western Europe and Japan goes
well-beyond the formal technical assistance program. U.S. e⁄orts to boost productivity in
its sphere of in￿ uence were part of a broader national security policy after 1953 and were in
large part driven by the geopolitical realities of the Cold War.
What is important for the rest of our analysis is that the emphasis of these knowledge
transfers was on modern, state-of-the-art, technologies. Because of this, if technical assis-
tance related knowledge spillovers were an important driving force of a postwar acceleration
in technology adoption in Western Europe and Japan, then we would this expect this to be
especially the case for newer technologies.
1.2 Other factors underlying postwar catch-up
Most alternative explanations of the postwar ￿supergrowth￿period have very di⁄erent im-
plications for the cross-technology variation in the changes in the speed of adoption from the
old and new technology distinction emphasized above.
Explanations that emphasize country-speci￿c rather than technology-speci￿c explana-
tions imply that, to a ￿rst order, the e⁄ect of postwar changes on technology adoption
should be symmetric across technologies.
For example, Eichengreen (2007) emphasizes the reshu› ing of the social contract between
the government, employers, and workers, after WWII in Western Europe. He argues that
this led to a type of ￿coordinated capitalism￿with high savings and subdued wage growth.
Such a process can de￿nitely explain many facts about the postwar growth experiences of
leading industrialized nations. However, it applies as much to old as to new technologies.
Similarly, explanations based on country-speci￿c factors such as changes in institutions
and openness to trade do not explain the di⁄erential pattern of reduction in adoption lags
12between new and old technologies.9
Besides country-speci￿c factors, another factor often mentioned in relationship to the
postwar productivity boost in Western Europe and Japan is Olson￿ s (1982) theory of social
rigidities. Olson argues that ￿the emasculation and abolishment of distributional coali-
tions...￿during postwar occupation and as part of the Marshall Plan reduced the special
interest groups that had lobbied to slow down technology adoption before WWII.
If Olson￿ s (1982) mechanism is an important factor driving the acceleration of technology
adoption after WWII then this acceleration would be particularly pronounced for technolo-
gies whose adoption impeded on the interest of these lobbying groups. To distinguish between
technologies for which this could be important or not, we follow Comin and Hobijn (2009a)
and classify technologies in our dataset into ones that are likely to be subject to lobbying and
one that are not. Since this classi￿cation is di⁄erent from the ￿ old￿versus ￿ new￿distinction
we discussed before, this means that Olson￿ s (1982) hypothesis has di⁄erent cross-technology
implications from the technical assistance factor we focus on.
To set the stage for the rest of our analysis, consider Figure 3. It depicts per capita GDP
levels relative to the U.S. in 1950 and 1970 for the 39 countries in our sample. The further
a country is above the 45-degree line the faster it caught up with the U.S. during the three
decades following the war. Black dots represent countries that received substantial postwar
U.S. economic aid and technical assistance. As can be seen from the picture, countries that
received U.S. support seem to have caught up faster than their counterparts. What we
show in the remainder of our analysis is that those countries that received U.S. support saw
disproportionate declines in their technology gaps with the U.S. in terms of new technologies
and that the change in this gap explains a signi￿cant part of the cross-country variation
depicted in Figure 3.
In order to relate postwar growth to an acceleration in the speed of technology adoption,
9See Alvarez-Cuadrado and Pintea (2009) for a quantitive analysis of many of these factors in a theoretical
growth model.
13we ￿rst need to quantify this speed. Because of the inherent non-linear nature of the tech-
nology usage measures depicted in panels (b)-(d) in Figure 2, quantifying this speed involves
relating these non-linearities to an interpretable measure of the speed of technology adop-
tion. For this purpose, we introduce a model of economic growth and technology adoption in
the next section which relates cross country growth dynamics to our measures of technology
usage and allows us to interpret their observed curvature in terms of the amount of time
that elapses between the invention of a technology and when it gets adopted in a country.
This delay is the adoption lag.
2 Model with endogenous TFP and adoption lags
We present a version of the model of technology adoption and growth introduced in Comin
and Hobijn (2010). The model that we present serves two main purposes. First, it allows us to
illustrate how the endogenously determined path of the adoption of technologies determines
the equilibrium level of aggregate total factor productivity. Thus relating the pattern of
technology adoption to the path of productivity that is so crucial for understanding the
postwar experiences of many industrialized economies. Second, we use the model to show how
the endogenous technology adoption patterns yield curvature in the time-path of measures of
technology di⁄usion for which we have data. It is the curvature in these di⁄usion measures
that we use to identify adoption lags in the data.
Contrary to Comin and Hobijn (2010), the analysis in this paper focuses on the transi-
tional dynamics of the model. This is important, because of the emphasis on the postwar
recovery in our analysis, which is inherently a realization of the transitional dynamics.10
Though our empirical analysis involves a cross-section of di⁄erent technologies, we present
our theoretical model here in a one-sector framework to simplify the exposition and to allow
for the study of aggregate dynamics that are comparable with available cross-country data.
10Christiano (1989), Chen, Imroho… glu, and Imroho… glu (2006), for example, emphasize the importance of
transitional dynamics for understanding the behavior of the Japanese saving rate since 1945. Gilchrist and
Williams (2004) do so for both Germany and Japan.
142.1 Preferences and technology
The unit measure of households in our model11 is assumed to have log preferences such
that the optimal savings decision implies that the growth rate of consumption equals the
di⁄erence between the real interest rate, e r, and the discount rate ￿. What is non-standard
is the technology side of our model. It is the focus of the rest of this subsection.
Capital vintages and adoption lags
Our framework is one in which, as in Parente and Prescott (1994) and Eaton and Kortum
(1997), the level of total factor productivity is determined by the distance between a country￿ s
productivity level and the world technology frontier. Throughout, we take the evolution of
the world technology frontier as exogenous.12 Here we describe what, in particular, we mean
by this distance. How this distance is the result of the technology adoption decisions of
capital goods producers is explained later in this section.
The single good in this economy, which we use as the numeraire good such that it has
a price of one, is produced using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution technology that is
used to combine a continuum of intermediate goods each produced with their own speci￿c
capital vintage, v. At each instant, t, a new capital vintage is introduced, such that the set
of available intermediate goods is given by v 2 V = (￿1;t].
We distinguish two groups of intermediates, indexed by ￿. The ￿rst, denoted by ￿ = o, is
the set of intermediates produced using old production methods, v < v. The second, denoted
by ￿ = n, consists of intermediate goods produced using production methods that involve
newer, more recently invented, v ￿ v, capital vintages. Hence, ￿ = o can be interpreted as
the old technology and ￿ = n as the new one.
11Throughout, we ignore population growth and just adjust for it in the calibration of our parameters.
12Eaton and Kortum (1997) ￿nd, in a di⁄erent theoretical framework, that endogenizing the path of the
frontier does not improve the ability of their model to explain the postwar manufacturing productivity paths
of Germany, Japan, France, the U.K., and the U.S..





















for ￿ = o;n. (2)
The set of vintages in use is thus given by V = Vo [ Vn. However, not all available interme-
diates are necessarily used for the production of output, such that V ￿ V .
The use of a more expansive set of intermediates a⁄ects productivity in two ways. First
of all, as already can be seen from (1) and (2), the use of more intermediates leads to a gain
from variety. We call this type of productivity gain the variety e⁄ect.
The second e⁄ect is because technological progress is embodied in new capital vintages.
Similar to Solow (1960), newer capital vintages are more productive than their older coun-
terparts. This di⁄erence in productivity levels is re￿ ected in the technologies with which the
intermediate goods are produced. Each intermediate, v, is produced by combining labor, Lv,






where Zv is the level of productivity embodied in the units of the capital vintage v. Zv is
constant over time and is increasing in v. Let ￿ be the growth rate of embodied technological
change, then
Zv = Z0e
￿v, where ￿ > 0. (4)
Hence, the world technology frontier consists of the productivity levels of the set of all
available vintages V . Moreover, if the set of technologies used, V , expands to include newer
vintages, then this increases the overall productivity level. We refer to this as the embodiment
13Here, and in the rest of this article, to save on notation we drop the time subscript, t, whenever its
presence is self-evident.
16e⁄ect of technology adoption.
If the most recent vintages are not used, then the embodied productivity level of the
vintages in use falls short of that of the frontier. How much it falls short depends on the gap
between the set of available and the set of used vintages.
Just like in Comin and Hobijn (2010) we consider the case in which the set of vintages in
use is of the form V = (￿1;t ￿ D]. Here D ￿ 0 is the time that elapsed since the invention
of the newest capital vintage that is being used in production. It is the adoption lag.
Capital goods production
Each capital vintage, v, is produced by a single monopolistic competitor. Capital goods
production is fully reversible and the unit production cost of a physical unit of capital is
assumed to be constant across vintages and normalized to one unit of the ￿nal good.14
Capital goods depreciate at the rate ￿. Because the suppliers of these capital vintages have
monopoly power, they can choose the rental rate Rv at which they rent the capital stock out.
The monopoly pro￿ts that these suppliers make are then used to pay o⁄the initial adoption
costs that they incurred to become the sole supplier of the particular capital vintage.
Technology adoption
In order to supply a particular capital vintage a ￿rm has to incur a one-time adoption cost.
These costs go up in the distance between the vintage adopted and the best vintage in place.
In particular, let vt = t￿Dt denote the best vintage adopted at instant t, then the adoption

















14Comin and Hobijn (2010) are more speci￿c about the distinction between investment-speci￿c and em-
bodied technological change. For the empirical methodology applied here, the distinction does not matter,
however. Hence, we ignore it in the rest of our exposition.
17where b > 0 and ￿ > 0.
Hence, the adoption costs increase in the rate at which the set of adopted vintages
expands. However, they are lower, the further away one is from the world technology frontier,
as re￿ ected by the productivity of the most recent vintage invented, Zt. The parameter ￿
can be interpreted as the absorption rate. Discrete jumps in the set of adopted vintages, and
thus in the adoption lag, are in￿nitely expensive and do not occur. Instead, the adoption
lags evolve smoothly over time.
The other parameter that determines the adoption costs is b, which is similar in inter-
pretation to the barriers to adoption in Parente and Prescott (1994).15
The last term of the adjustment costs re￿ ect that they are increasing in the size of the
market. This is, on a theoretical level, important to assure the existence of a balanced
growth path on which adoption lags are constant. Moreover, it is consistent with evidence
that technology adoption involves a substantial use of resources beyond the installation of
equipment.16 The costs of these resources are generally increasing in the size of the market,
i.e. the marginal product of their use elsewhere in the economy.
2.2 Factor demands, aggregation, and productivity
Factor demands
The nested CES structure of the production function and the assumption that all factor in-
puts can adjust ￿ exibly yields familiar expressions for the relative demands for intermediates
and for prices. That is, the demand for the intermediate produced using vintage v equals




15￿ is the steady-state stock market capitalization to GDP ratio, which is derived in the appendix. We
include it and the other constant term to normalize the adoption costs to simplify the equilibrium expressions
of the model.
16See Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) for an analysis of the costs of adoption of information technologies.













Here, W is the real wage rate paid for the labor input Lv.
As in Comin and Hobijn (2010), the monopolistic competitor that supplies capital goods
of vintage v realizes that it faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its capital goods.
This demand curve is downward sloping because an increase in the rental cost, Rv, raises the
prices of the intermediates produced using capital vintage v. Such a price increase reduces
demand for the intermediate good and thus for the capital goods used in their production.
Taking this into account, the pro￿t-maximizing rental rate, Rv, that the supplier of capital
good v chooses is equal to a gross-markup times the user-cost of capital. This rental rate is








This, combined with (7), implies that relative prices across intermediate inputs fully re￿ ect
relative embodied productivity levels for the capital vintages used to produce the interme-
diates.
Aggregation
The result is that we obtain very tractable aggregate production function representations.
Because, for our empirical analysis, we use data at the technology level, i.e. ￿ 2 fo;ng,
we build the aggregation results up from that level. That is, we can write the level of


























For results used for our empirical application, it is useful to realize that this aggregation












while the demand for output of technology ￿ is given by the iso-elastic demand function




and the rental cost share of capital is equal to ￿, such that
R￿K￿ = ￿P￿Y￿. (13)
In a similar way, the technology-speci￿c production functions yield an aggregate produc-
tion function representation, which reads
Y = AK
￿L
1￿￿, where K ￿ Ko + Kn, L ￿ Lo + Ln, (14)
























20Productivity and adoption lags
These aggregation results allow us to relate the technology-speci￿c and aggregate produc-
tivity levels, A￿ and A, to the set of vintages adopted, i.e. to V , and thus to the adoption
lags, D.



















Here (t ￿ D ￿ v) is the measure of vintages of the new technology that is in use, i.e. of
Vn = (v;t ￿ D]. This measure shows up in two ways. First, through the embodiment e⁄ect,
which re￿ ects that the average embodied productivity level is increasing in the number of
vintages of the new technology in use. This is what drives long-run growth in the adoption
of the new technology and in the economy as a whole.
Second, the measure of vintages adopted also shows up because there are gains from
variety in the CES production function. Since, in the long-run the growth rate of the
number of varieties goes to zero, the variety e⁄ect is important during the early stages of
adoption of the new technology and tapers o⁄ as the use of the technology becomes more
widespread. It is this time-varying e⁄ect of the variety e⁄ect that drives curvature in the
measured adoption of new technologies that we exploit in our empirical analysis.
The aggregate TFP level can be derived in a similar fashion. However, because aggregate
TFP is driven by the whole set of vintages in use, i.e. V = (￿1;t ￿ D], which does not
have an expanding measure of vintages adopted, the aggregate TFP level is not subject to
the variety e⁄ect. As a result, it can be written as
At = A0e






Hence, aggregate TFP in this model is endogenously determined by the adoption lags induced
21by the barriers to entry. The adoption lag, D, can be interpreted as the distance from the
world technology frontier measured in years.
2.3 Optimal adoption
So far, we have derived how the adoption lag a⁄ects the equilibrium level of productivity.
We have not, however, solved for the optimal technology adoption decision that determines
the lag. This is what we do here.
We denote the market value of a ￿rm that supplies capital goods v at instant t, after
entry into the market, as Mv;t. Any vintage gets adopted whenever, at time t, this market
value exceeds the adoption cost, ￿v;t, a ￿rm needs to incur to enter the market. That is, for
all vintages v that are being adopted at time t, it must be the case that
￿v;t ￿ Mv;t. (18)
If there is a positive adoption lag, then this holds with equality for the best vintage that is
being adopted.
















Here ￿t is the total market value of all capital goods suppliers relative to GDP, which, if
they are all publicly traded, can be interpreted as the stock market to GDP ratio.
Combining (5), (18), and (19), yields that the adoption lag sati￿es the di⁄erential equa-
tion







The intuition behind this equation is as follows. The higher the current adoption lag, the
cheaper the adoption of technologies and the more quickly the adoption lag declines. The
22higher the stock market to GDP ratio, ￿t, the higher the ratio of future bene￿ts from
adoption relative to the current costs and the faster the adoption lag declines. Finally, the
higher the barriers to entry, b, the more expensive is technology adoption and the adoption
lag will decline less quickly. In fact, in steady state, where _ D = 0, the adoption lag equals
b=￿. In steady state, b is the percentage productivity loss due to the barriers to entry.
2.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is de￿ned in a similar way as in Comin and Hobijn (2010). The details of
this de￿nition are relegated to the technical appendix. Two non-standard features of the
equilibrium are worth pointing out here.
First, for the aggregate equilibrium, it is important to know the amount of resources








Second, the aggregate resource constraint includes the aggregate adoption costs, such
that
Y = C + I + ￿. (22)
For our empirical analysis in Section 3 and beyond, we assume that adoption costs are
measured as ￿nal demand. In particular, we assume that adjustment costs are measured
as gross investment expenditures. This allows us to interpret Y as measured GDP, C as
measured consumption, and I + ￿ as measured investment.17
The long-run growth rate of the economy only depends on the, exogenously given, growth
rate of the world technology frontier. In particular, on the balanced growth path, this
economy grows at rate ￿=(1 ￿ ￿).









Y = C + I.
233 Identi￿cation and estimation of adoption lags
So far, our focus has been on the aggregate dynamics of our model. When we described
the model, we speci￿cally de￿ned an old and a new technology. Moreover, we derived the
equilibrium path of output and capital for the new technology as a function of the adoption
lags. We did so to be able to map the equilibrium variables in our model into observed
measures of technology usage, taken from Comin and Hobijn (2009b). In this section we
describe this mapping and how it allows us to obtain estimates of technology adoption lags.
3.1 Technology measures
The data we use from Comin and Hobijn (2009b) contain two types of measures of technology
usage for a broad range of countries and a very long timespan. First, the equivalent of Yn, is
output produced with di⁄erent technologies. Examples are mWHr of electricity generated,
the number of telegrams sent, and the number of ton-kilometers of freight transported by
rail. The second type of measure, equivalent to Kn, consists of the number of the units of
capital goods used to produce a particular intermediate Like trucks that are used to provide
road-freight transportation services, telephone. Examples of such measures were depicted in
Figure 2. Table 1 contains a list of the 10 technologies we use for our analysis. The choice
of these technologies is mainly determined by the data requirements of the method applied.
That is, we choose technologies for which we have a substantial number of observations
for many years and countries both before and after WWII. The table also includes the
classi￿cation of the technologies into ￿ old￿and ￿ new￿ . Technologies are classi￿ed as ￿ new￿if
they were invented after 1850.
Our model has direct implications for the paths of these variables. This can be seen by
combining (11), (12), and (13) and taking logarithms. Denoting logs of variables by small
24letters, e.g. y￿ = lnY￿, this yields that
y￿ = y +
￿
￿ ￿ 1
[a￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l) ￿ ￿r￿ ￿ ￿ln￿], (23)
and
k￿ = y + ln￿ +
1
￿ ￿ 1
[a￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l) ￿ ￿r￿ ￿ ￿ln￿] ￿ r￿. (24)
The main driving force behind the curvature in the technology usage measures is the
productivity term, a￿. To understand how the adoption lags a⁄ect this curvature, consider
Figure 4. It plots the path of a￿ for ￿ve di⁄erent cases. The ￿rst is the case vintages get
adopted the instant they are invented, i.e. the world technology frontier. The curvature in
the world technology frontier is driven by the variety e⁄ect. That is, in the early stages of the
adoption of a technology the increase in the number of vintages causes growth to exceed the
long run level of embodied technological change that sets in as the variety e⁄ect dissipates.
The next two curves are those for constant adoption lags D￿ > D > 0. These curves are
horizontal shifts in the world technology frontier, where the size of the shift determines the
technology adoption lag. Two of the paths are based on simulations18 in which there is an
acceleration in technology adoption in the sense that at ￿rst adoption lags are constant at
D￿. However, at a certain point the adoption barriers are lowered and there is a transition
toward shorter adoption lags of length D. What distinguishes these two paths is that for
one the technology is relatively new while for the other it is older.
As can be seen from this ￿gure, if the adoption lags are constant then they are identi￿ed by
the relative curvature of the path of a￿ at a particular point in time. This is the identi￿cation
strategy used in Comin and Hobijn (2010). However, our interest here is also in seeing
whether we can identify changes in adoption lags over time for the same technology. The
identi￿cation is a lot more complicated in that case. The initial adoption lag is determined
18These paths are simulated using parameter values that are chosen to match U.S. balanced growth
properties and the postwar catch-up in real GDP relative to the U.S. by Japan. The basic shape of the paths
plotted is not very sensitive to the parameter choice.
25by the curvature in the early part of the sample and the change in the adoption lag is
implied by the change in the intercept between the extrapolated initial path and the actual
observed path for a￿. The change in curvature in the middle part of the sample is due to
the adjustment process. This change is what limits our analysis to technologies for which
we have relatively long time-series evidence both before and after WWII.
3.2 Reduced form equation
To get from equations (23) and (24) to the reduced form equations we actually estimate, we
take the steps described in this subsection.19
It turns out that, to ￿rst order, the productivity growth rate ￿ does not matter for the
variety e⁄ect and thus for the curvature in a￿. Therefore, as in Comin and Hobijn (2010),
we log-linearize a￿ around ￿ = 0. Both y￿ and k￿ depend on the rental rate r￿. We use the
optimal saving decision in the model to log-linearize the rental rate, which yields that r￿ is
approximately proportional to the growth rate of consumption, ￿c.20
The ￿nal steps have to do with that, using data for several technologies, we need to drop
the one-sector assumption we used to derive the model and need to generalize our functional
forms to accommodate the multi-technology nature of our data.
Just like in Comin and Hobijn (2010), to allow for multiple sectors, we use a nested
CES aggregator, where ￿
￿￿1 re￿ ects the between-sector elasticity of demand and
￿
￿￿1 is the
within-sector elasticity of demand. In addition, the embodied technological change, ￿￿, and
the invention date, v￿, vary across technologies.
Finally, in Section 1 we documented very di⁄erent rates of capital destruction during
WWII across the di⁄erent technologies in our dataset. Since the model we considered has
￿ exible capital mobility, it would imply an immediate replenishment of these capital losses
and equate them across technologies. Hence, our model is not consistent with this varying
19We limit ourselves to a short description and present the details behind these steps in the Appendix.
20Throughout, we have derived our results for log preferences, i.e. an intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion equal to 1. This log-linear approximation actually holds for CRRA preferences with any intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
26impact. To match this feature of the data, we add a capital adjustment cost term to the
equation.21 The adjustment cost variable is denoted by X￿ below. It equals the investment
to capital ratio for k￿ and output growth rate for y￿.22
We make the following assumption about the adoption lag: before the war it is equal to
D￿ and starting in 1945 it potentially converges to D 6= D￿. We study both the restricted
case where D = D￿ as well as the unrestricted case. We exclude the war years 1939 through
1945 from our sample.
When we de￿ne the technology measures as m￿ 2 fy￿;k￿g then the unrestricted reduced
form equation that we estimate can be written as
m￿ = ￿0 + y + ￿1 [(￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ D ￿ 1(t < 1939)￿D ￿ v￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l)] (25)
+￿2 (t ￿ D ￿ 1(t < 1939)￿D ￿ v￿) + ￿3￿c + ￿4X￿.
This equation is derived in detail in Appendix A. Here 1(:) is an indicator function that is
one if the condition holds and zero otherwise. The prewar adoption lag equals D￿ = D+￿D.
Finally, as we discussed above, we capture the transitional dynamics by the usercost term,
￿3, and the adjustment cost term ￿4.
3.3 Estimation
In principle, having data for many technologies and many countries, we can combine the
country-technology equations and obtain a very large system of non-linear equations based
on (25) to estimate. In practice, this turns out to be infeasible. Hence, instead of taking a
system estimation approach, we estimate (25) for each country and technology separately.
However, because (25) implies cross-country restrictions on the parameters, we do not do
so in an unrestricted manner. We impose these cross-country restrictions by applying the
21The pro￿t maximization problem subject to these adjustment costs that results in the inclusion of this
term in our equations is described in the appendix.
22We assume that these costs are only present during the postwar recovery.
27U.S. estimates for all countries for the parameters that are assumed to be constant across
countries. There are two parameters, ￿ and ￿, which we do not estimate but for which we
simply impose the calibrated parameter values used in Comin and Hobijn (2010), which are
based on postwar U.S. evidence.
There is another advantage of this approach over a system estimation of the parameters.
Because we apply this model to a very broad sample of countries and system estimation
would be a⁄ected by serious misspeci￿cation of the model or measurement error in the data
for each of these countries. Using this approach, we basically assume the model is properly
speci￿ed and the data are relatively reliably measured for the United States to identify the
common parameters across countries.
The cross-country parameter restrictions we impose across countries are based on the
assumption that the technology parameters are the same across countries and that what
potentially di⁄ers are adoption lags, preferences, and adjustment costs. This assumption
means that ￿1 and ￿2 are the same across countries and that the other parameters can
potentially vary. We estimate each equation using non-linear least squares.
Note that the parameter ￿2 captures the linear trend in the di⁄usion process of technology
and that we estimate a di⁄erent trend for each technology. This trend captures a variety
of elements including embodied and disembodied productivity growth and the evolution of
demand for the technology as countries develop (i.e. the Engel curve). Since the trend
is speci￿c to each technology, it captures the substitution away from old technologies that
eventually are dominated by a superior technology (e.g. telegrams). These dynamics will
not be re￿ ected in the estimates of the adoption lags, neither in the level (i.e. D) nor on
the postwar change (i.e. 4D), which are identi￿ed through the curvature of the di⁄usion
process.
It is also relevant for our analysis to discuss how variation in disembodied technological
productivity, or in the size of the economy, a⁄ects our identi￿ed changes in the adoption lags.
As can be seen from equations (20) and (25), changes in the disembodied part of TFP and
28the size of the economy do not a⁄ect the equilibrium adoption lags since they equally a⁄ect
the costs and bene￿ts of adoption.23 In fact, peristent changes in disembodied productivity
do not even a⁄ect adoption lags much along the transitional path. This can be seen from the
simulated transition path for a permanent upward shift in disembodied productivity plotted
in Figure 4.
To induce some e⁄ects on our estimated adoption lags, we need to make the assumption
that wages do not adjust temporarily to the increase in market size or in overall TFP.
Incidentally, this assumption corresponds to the hypothesis presented in Eichengreen (2007)
who argued that after WWII there was a change in the social contract in Europe which
tempered unions￿demands for wage increases despite the accelerating productivity. In that
event, an increase in e¢ ciency or market size shall have a larger e⁄ect on the revenues than
in the costs of adopting and using new technologies leading to a temporary increase in our
technology usage measure, m￿, and to a reduction in the di⁄usion lags.24 Note however, that
this comparative dynamics would, to a ￿rst order, a⁄ect all the technologies symmetrically.
4 Results
We present our results in three parts. In the ￿rst part, we summarize the estimated changes
in adoption lags that we obtained using the method described above. In the second part, we
estimate the association between the change in the speed of adoption and several measures
of U.S. postwar involvement. In the ￿nal part, we study the association between technology
adoption and postwar growth.
23This equal e⁄ect of disembodied productivity on these costs and bene￿ts is necessary for the model to
have a balanced growth path with constant adoption lags.
24This argument can be formalized either by using the optimal adoption equation in the model (20) or by
using the reduced form expression for the demand for our technology measures (23) or (24).
294.1 Estimated changes in the adoption lags
The parameter estimates for the U.S. speci￿cation as well as for the level of the adoption
lags, D, are very similar to those reported in Comin and Hobijn (2010). That study also
shows that a simpli￿ed version of speci￿cation (25) ￿ts the di⁄usion curves for a sample of
technologies and countries that contains those in our sample well. Therefore, we focus our
analysis on the estimated changes in the adoption lags.
Just like in (25) we use the convention that a positive change in the adoption lag re￿ ects
a increase in the speed of adoption. In this sense, we estimate the reduction in the adoption
lag. In terms of the notation in (25), we estimate ￿Dc￿, where c denotes the country and ￿
the technology.
In practice, we obtain several estimates of ￿Dc￿ because we use various speci￿cations
nested in (25) that di⁄er in terms of the inclusion of the adoption costs and the user cost
and in whether the adjustment cost parameter is restricted to equal to for the U.S. We do
not need to take a stance on the right model speci￿cation. Instead, for each technology-
country pair, we compute the average reduction in the adoption lag across the di⁄erent
speci￿cations.25
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our estimates of the reduction in the adoption
lags after WWII. On average adoption lags decreased slightly after WWII in the sample of
technologies and countries we analyze. There are signi￿cant di⁄erences across technologies.
While ￿ new￿technologies experienced a reduction in adoption lags of almost 4 years, ￿ old￿
technologies experienced an average increase in the adoption lags of 4 years.
There is signi￿cant variation in the changes in adoption lags even within our groups
of technologies. For example, across old technologies, the average reduction in adoption
lags varies from 13 years for steam and motor ships to an increase by 29 years for rail
transportation of passengers. This might be problematic because of the unbalanced nature
25As in Comin and Hobijn (2010), we restrict attention to those estimates that are plausible and precise.
See Comin and Hobijn (2010) for how we de￿ne these.
30of our panel of estimated declines in adoption lags. In particular, if the countries that received
U.S. help over the postwar period are over-represented in our sample in technologies with
increases in lags (e.g. railways) while countries that did not received U.S. help are over-
represented in technologies that experienced declines in lags (e.g. steam and motor ships),
we could incorrectly conclude that U.S. help is associated with an increase in the adoption
lags.
This example is actually a good description of the unbalance in our sample of estimates.
We take care of this problem by including technology ￿xed e⁄ects in the regressions where
we study the drivers or e⁄ects of adoption lags in new vs. old technologies.
In addition to the distinction between old and new technologies, we distinguish between
technologies with and without a close predecessor. As argued in Comin and Hobijn (2009a),
this distinction allows us to explore Mancur Olson￿ s (1982) hypothesis that interest groups
associated with incumbent technologies may slowdown the di⁄usion of a new superior tech-
nology. If this is the main driving force of the adoption lag reductions in our data then
these reductions should be especially large for those technologies that were substituting a
predecessor technology.
Key to the implementation of this test is the classi￿cation of new technologies between
those that have and those that do not have a competing predecessor. Comin and Hobijn
(2009a) use the relative productivity between new and incumbent technologies to conduct
this classi￿cation. Table 2 reproduces the relative productivity of new technologies based on
the micro studies surveyed in Comin and Hobijn (2009a). According to this classi￿cation,
radio, trucks and cars have a competing predecessor while electricity, planes and telephone
do not have a competing predecessor.
When classifying new technologies in these two groups, we ￿nd that technologies without
a competing predecessor tended to experience larger reductions in adoption lags than those
with one. In particular the lags of the former declined by almost 13 years, while those of
the later increased on average by 5 years. Note that this is the opposite pattern one would
31expect if Olsonian incumbent dynamics were less prevalent after WWII.
4.2 E⁄ect of postwar U.S. assistance on adoption
The ￿rst stage of our analysis involves analyzing whether the U.S. postwar involvement
changed the adoption dynamics and did so di⁄erently for old and new technologies. We
consider three measures of U.S. involvement. The ￿rst is a dummy that is equal to one if the
country received signi￿cant U.S. assistance. That basically corresponds to those countries
that participated in the Marshall Plan and to Japan. Second, we consider the total expen-
diture in the U.S. technology assistance program (TAP) in the country. Finally, we consider
the total U.S. aid expenditures between 1948 and 1953.
Table 3 reports the estimates of the e⁄ect of the U.S. postwar involvement measures on
the reduction in the lags after WWII. The main ￿nding from our estimates, reported in
columns I through III is that a larger U.S. involvement is associated with a larger reduction
in the adoption lags for new technologies. This e⁄ect is considerable. The average country
that received signi￿cant postwar U.S. assistance experienced a reduction in the lags with
which new technologies were adopted of about 4.5 years. Similarly, a one standard deviation
increase in the U.S. expenditure in either the technology assistance program or the Marshall
plan is associated with a decline in the adoption lags of new technologies of approximately
2.5 years. the e⁄ects for old technologies are even larger.
In contrast, for old technologies we ￿nd that a larger U.S. involvement is associated with
an increase in the adoption lags. These e⁄ects seem even larger than for new technologies.
The average country that received signi￿cant postwar U.S. assistance experienced an increase
in the lags with which new technologies were adopted of about 14 years.
One may wonder whether the e⁄ects of assistance on the adoption lags persist after
controlling for any country-speci￿c characteristic. To explore this, we re-run the regressions
with country ￿xed e⁄ects. Since the assistance variables only have cross-country variation,
this exercise only allows us to identify their di⁄erential e⁄ect on the reduction in the lags of
32new vs. old technologies. The results, reported in columns IV through VI, show that the
e⁄ect of U.S. postwar assistance on adoption is very robust. Even after controlling for any
possible country-speci￿c factor, U.S. assistance is associated with a larger reduction in the
adoption lags of new than old technologies. The average country that received signi￿cant
postwar U.S. assistance experienced a reduction in the adoption lags of new technologies
16.5 years larger than in the lags of old ones.
This ￿nding is relevant since most of the omitted variables that could be driving the
association between the assistance programs and the reduction in adoption lags should, a
priori, a⁄ect all technologies more or less symmetrically. Take the power of unions, for
example. If, as argued by Eichengreen (2007), the foreign intervention leads to a new social
contract that reduces union demands, this should enhance investment in all forms of capital,
those that embody new technologies and those that embody old technologies. So, to a ￿rst
order, we should observe that the e⁄ects of such policies be captured by the country ￿xed
e⁄ect. The same is true for other changes that a⁄ect the size or e¢ ciency of the economy such
as the process of European integration or policies that lead to a more e¢ cient bureaucracy,
lower taxes, or less distorted markets. The fact that we are observing such a large and
signi￿cant di⁄erential e⁄ect on the adoption lag of the new technologies leads us to believe
that the driver of the e⁄ect of the assistance variables on the decline in adoption lags was
not a general increase in e¢ ciency.
Olson (1982) implies that the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the U.S. assistance in the di⁄usion
of new technologies is due not to a transfer of technology but to a reduction of the power
of incumbent producers. These producers might have used their power to raise barriers
that slowdown the di⁄usion of new technologies before WWII. As their power weakened,
new the di⁄usion of new technologies could have accelerated. Table 4 tests this hypothesis
by estimating the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the U.S. assistance variables on the di⁄usion of new
technologies with and without a close predecessor. Contrary to the Olsonian hypothesis,
we ￿nd that technologies with a close predecessor did not experience a larger acceleration
33in di⁄usion than those without such close predecessors. This conclusion is robust to the
inclusion of country ￿xed e⁄ects as shown in columns IV through VI.
Hence, we conclude a signi￿cant part of the postwar dynamics of technology di⁄usion we
have uncovered can be explained by the U.S. assistance programs that resulted in a transfer
of knowledge from the U.S. to other nations. This does not mean that the alternative driving
forces we discussed did not contribute, it means that they do not match the cross-technology
variation that we uncovered in the data.
4.3 E⁄ect of adoption on per capita GDP
We conclude our analysis by exploring whether postwar reductions in adoption lags are
associated with faster growth. We do that by estimating the following speci￿cation
y1970c = ￿ + ￿ ￿ y1950c + ￿ ￿ ￿Dc + ￿c (26)
where yTc denotes the log of per capita income in year T in country c, ￿Dc is the average
reduction in adoption lags across technologies for country c, and ￿c is an error term.
In the ￿rst column of Table 5, we estimate the e⁄ect of the reduction in the new tech-
nologies adoption lags on (log) per capita income in 1970. We ￿nd that the reduction in the
lag with which new technologies were adopted after WWII is signi￿cantly associated with
faster postwar growth in per capita income.26 In particular, the reduction of an additional
year in the avarage lag with which new technologies were adopted led to a 1 percent increase
in per capita income in 1970. This implies that a one standard deviation decline in the
adoption lags for new technologies is associated with an increase in the annual growth rate
of per capita income of 0.65 percentage points between 1950 and 1970.
In column II we estimate the growth e⁄ects of a reduction in the adoption lags of the old
technologies. For these technologies, we ￿nd no signi￿cant growth e⁄ect associated with an
26This is consistent with Dowrick and Rogers￿(2002) ￿nding that allowing for technology catch-up signif-
icantly enhances the ￿t of conventional cross-country growth regressions.
34acceleration in their di⁄usion. Columns III through VI show that these ￿ndings are robust to
controlling for postwar institutions and policies. In particular, they are robust to controlling
for the initial competition in the political system as measured by Polity and to the degree
of trade openness in the economy openness as measured by the ratio of exports plus imports
over GDP. The results are also robust to controlling for the change in these variables between
1950 and 1970.
Hence, this suggests that the acceleration in the speed of di⁄usion of new technologies
during the postwar period might have been a signi￿cant driver of the extraordinary growth
performance of several western European countries and Japan.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we revisited the remarkable postwar growth experiences of Western European
countries and Japan. In addition to considering the oft-studied gains in real GDP per capita,
we also considered technology usage measures for ten technologies taken from Comin and
Hobijn (2009b).
The evidence we presented showed that, in terms of real GDP per capita, these countries
did not return to their prewar growth path. They, instead, moved up to a higher path than
they were on before the war. This boost in growth was mainly driven by growth in Total
Factor Productivity. It was also accompanied by commensurate increases in technology
usage.
We introduced a version of the model of technology adoption and economic growth from
Comin and Hobijn (2010) to translate these changes in the usage of these technologies into
estimates of the acceleration in the speed of adoption of these technologies. We use this
model to estimate changes in the time between the invention and adoption of 10 di⁄erent
technologies for 39 countries that occurred after WWII.
Our estimates reveal that good postwar growth performances relative to the U.S. hap-
35pened in countries that also saw a relatively large pickup in the speed of adoption of tech-
nologies that had been invented less than a century before the end of the war. For older
technologies, this positive correlation between postwar catch-up and changes in adoption
lags is not present.
We document that a substantial part of the cross-country variation in these changes
in adoption lags can be explained by di⁄erences in the amount of postwar U.S. economic
aid and technical assistance across countries. We interpret this is evidence of technology
transfers from the U.S. to Western Europe and Japan being an important driving force of
the impressive postwar growth performance by these recipients.
Of course, such technology transfers were probably not the sole driving force of the
￿supergrowth￿that many countries experienced in the postwar period. Many studies, like
for example Alvarez-Cuadrado and Pintea (2009), Eichengreen (2007), and Olson (1982),
have proposed alternative explanations. None of these explanations, however, is consistent
with the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the changes in the adoption of old and new technologies. This
does not mean that they did not contribute to postwar catch-up in Western Europe and
Japan, but it does mean that they can not account for the variation in technology adoption
patterns that we have uncovered in the data.
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46Figure 1: Changes in real GDP and technology usage per capita during WWII period.
47Figure 2: Real GDP and technology usage per capita for four countries
48Figure 3: Postwar catch-up in real GDP per capita.
Figure 4: Path of technology-speci￿c TFP under di⁄erent scenarios.
49A Online Appendix: Mathematical derivations
This appendix contains mathematical details behind the equations presented in the main text. Because the
model we use is based on the one introduced in Comin and Hobijn (2010), the derivations here are, in many
respects, similar to the ones in that study. The main di⁄erence is the explicit introduction of adoption lags,
Dt, as a state variable and the derivation of the resulting dynamics. Equations and results are derived in
the order they appear in the main text.
Derivation of equation (8):
The demand for capital of a particular vintage is given by the factor demand equation
RvKv = ￿PvYv. (27)
Since revenue generated from the output produced with the vintage is determined by the demand function
(6), we can write






Moreover, the price of the output produced with this vintage is given by the equilibrium unit production
cost, such that we can write







































The Lagrangian associated with the dynamic pro￿t maximization problem of the supplier of capital good v









50where Hvs is the current value Hamiltonian. We will drop the time subscript s in what follows. Here
Hv = (RvKv ￿ QIv) + (33)
￿v
 













￿v (Iv ￿ ￿Kv).
Here ￿v is the co-state variable associated with the demand function that the capital goods supplier faces
and ￿v is the co-state variable associated with the capital accumulation equation.
The resulting optimality conditions read
w.r.t. Rv: (1 + ￿v)Kv + (￿ ￿ 1)￿vKv = 0.
w.r.t. Iv: ￿v = 1.

















(e r + ￿) = R,











Derivation of intermediate technology aggregation results:




































Lvdv = (1 ￿ ￿)
Z
v2V￿








PvYvdv = ￿P￿Y￿. (41)


















































































The value of the unit production cost follows from the unit production cost of a Cobb-Douglas production
function. The aggregation results at the highest level of aggregation can be derived in a similar way.








































Derivation of aggregate TFP, (17):






















e￿(t￿Dt) = A0e￿(t￿Dt) .
Derivation of equation (19):
From the demand function we obtain that the revenue from output produced with capital goods of vintage



























This means that the market value of each of the capital goods suppliers of vintage v, at time t equals the


































































is the total market value of all monopolistic competitors.
Derivation of equilibrium adoption lag, (20):
The optimal adoption of technology vintages implies that the best vintage adopted at each instant satis￿es
￿v = Mv. (54)






















































Combining this with the market value of the capital goods supplier of capital good v, we obtain that
















Rearranging this yields that







Derivation of aggregate adoption costs, (21):


















this simpli￿es to equation (21) in the main text.
Equilibrium:











￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
(62)
54where we have used that the real interest rate is related to the marginal product of capital as follows;







Yt = Ct + It + ￿t; (64)
The capital accumulation equation




The aggregate TFP equation
At = A0e￿vt; (67)







The adoption lag equation

















































Our model implies that
at = a0 + ￿ (t ￿ Dt). (72)
55Taking time-derivatives of this equation yields that
_ at = ￿ ￿ ￿Dt. (73)
Given (17) and (20) this can be written as













t = At exp(￿t) is the world technology frontier. In this case ￿ corresponds to the parameter s in
Benhabib and Spiegel￿ s (2006) general speci￿cation.
Log-linearization of an:











We are interested in the behavior of this TFP for ￿ # 0. In that case, there is no embodied productivity
growth and the increase in productivity after the introduction of the technology is all due to the introduction
of an increasing number of varieties over time.


























= Zv (t ￿ D ￿ v)
(￿￿1) . (77)
56Taking the ￿rst order Taylor approximation around ￿ = 0 yields that
An ￿ Zv (t ￿ D ￿ v)
(￿￿1) + (78)







































(t ￿ D ￿ v)
(￿￿2) ￿
















5(t ￿ D ￿ v)
(￿￿2) ￿




Zv (t ￿ D ￿ v)
￿ ￿






(t ￿ D ￿ v)￿
￿
.
Hence, for ￿ close to zero, we can use the log-linear approximation
an ￿ zv + (￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ D ￿ v) +
￿
2
(t ￿ D ￿ v). (79)
Change in D:
However, our aim is to estimate how D changes in response to the technical assistance provided by the U.S.





D￿ = D ￿ ￿D for t < 1939
D for t > 1945
,
where we are agnostic about the path of D during WWII because we do not using data from the warperiod
for our empirical analysis. This is the approximation that underlies (25) in the main text.
Microfoundation for capital adjustment costs:
The capital goods of technology ￿ are all produced by perfectly competitive producers. The individual
producers of the vintages then buy the technology-speci￿c capital goods and modify them to the vintage-
speci￿c speci￿cation.
57The Lagrangian associated with the dynamic pro￿t maximization problem of the supplier of capital









where H￿ is the current value Hamiltonian. We will drop the time subscript s in what follows. Here
H￿ =
￿
~ R￿K￿ ￿ I￿
￿
+ (81)
￿￿ (I￿ (1 ￿ ￿ (I￿=K￿)) ￿ ￿K￿).
Here ￿￿ is the co-state variable associated with the demand function that the capital goods supplier faces
and ￿v is the co-state variable associated with the capital accumulation equation.





0 (I￿=K￿) ￿ ￿ (I￿=K￿)
￿
= 1.
w.r.t. K￿: ~ R￿ =
￿




































0 (I￿=K￿) ￿ ￿ (I￿=K￿)
￿￿ (84)
Substituting into the FOC w.r.t K￿; it follows that:
~ R￿ = UC￿ (85)
where the user cost term is given by
UC￿ =
 






























0 (I￿=K￿) ￿ ￿ (I￿=K￿)
￿￿1
.
58The problem of the monopolistic producers of the v capital good supplier of technology ￿ is then to
max
R￿v

















~ R￿ = R￿. (88)











This yields that the marginal adjustment cost, in terms of I=K net of depreciation, is given by
￿











while the second-order derivative is given by
￿
00 (I￿/K￿) = ￿. (91)
Log-linearization: We log-linearize the expression for the rental cost around the steady state I￿/K￿ = ￿.

























































Hence, this speci￿cation adds the investment to capital ratio to the reduced form equation for the
log-linearized rental rate. We will return to the term (r ￿ r) later.
Log-linearization of the interest rate:
Part of the issue is that, along the transition path, di⁄erence between the interest rate and the steady state
59interest rate is not constant. Hence, we need to ￿gure out a proxy for
(r ￿ r). (94)
This can be done by using the consumption Euler equation, which, for the CRRA preferences that we
use, implies that the growth rate of consumption equals the di⁄erence between the interest rate and the
intertemporal elasticity of subsitution, ￿. Note that in the main text, we assumed log-preferences such that
￿ = 1.
This means that




+ ￿ ￿ r. (95)
Hence, the o⁄-steady-state interest rate path term means that the growth rate of consumption is another
righthand-side variable.
Derivation of reduced form equation, (25):
Substituting (79), (93), (95), and the between sector elasticity parameter, ￿, into (23) and (24) we obtain
y￿ = y +
￿
￿ ￿ 1












k￿ = y + ln￿ +
1
￿ ￿ 1

















For the equation for the output-based measures, y￿, we get
y￿ = ￿0 + y + ￿1 [(￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ D ￿ v) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l)] +
￿2
￿
(t ￿ D ￿ v) ￿
(t ￿ 1945)






















































Using the discrete time approximation that ￿ct ￿
￿
C
C yields the reduced form equation, (25), presented in
the main text.
Similarly, for the equation for the capital-based measures, k￿, we get
k￿ = ￿0 + y + ￿1 [(￿ ￿ 1)ln(t ￿ D ￿ v) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(y ￿ l)] + (103)
￿2
￿
(t ￿ D ￿ v) ￿
(t ￿ 1945)

































+ ln(r + ￿) ￿ ￿
2￿ +
￿ ￿ r
r + ￿
￿
,
￿1 =
1
￿ ￿ 1
, (106)
￿2 =
1
￿ ￿ 1
￿
2
, (107)
￿3 = ￿
￿
1 +
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
1
r + ￿
, and (108)
￿4 = ￿
￿
1 +
￿
￿ ￿ 1
￿
￿￿. (109)
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